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LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION AND ITS
APPLICATION TO CANADIAN IMMIGRATION LAW
Debra Shapiro*

RtSUM]t
Une nouvelle doctrine juridique s'appliquant aux hauts-fonctionnaires qui
exercent des pouvoirs discr6tionnaires est en train d'6merger. Selon cette
doctrine dite d'attente l6gitime, le fonctionnaire qui, de par ses paroles ou sa
conduite, cr6e dans l'esprit de ceux qui seront affect6s par son pouvoir
discr6tionnaire une attente 16gitime quant A la fagon dont ce pouvoir sera
exercd, ne peut pas agir A 1'encontre de cette attente. Si tel est le cas, un
tribunal a le droit d'6mettre un avis et de demander une audience.
L'article examine la jurisprudence du Canada et de tout le Commonwealth
en la mati~re et en particulier dans le domaine du droit de l'immigration. I1
analyse ensuite le degr6 et les possibilit6s d'application de cette doctrine au
droit canadien de l'immigration.

INTRODUCTION
Legitimate expectation is an emerging legal doctrine which has developed
out of English law. The concept can be explained as follows:
"... where a public authority or an official exercising a power involving discretion creates by words or conduct a legitimate expectation in the minds of
person capable of being prejudicially affected by the power..., a court may
at the very least require reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard or
respond before the power is exercised contrary to the legitimate expectation
induced."l

Legitimate expectation is generally invoked as a ground giving rise to
procedural protection. While it is used in many areas of law, including
licensing, employment and local government finance, the courts have
* Copyright
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increasingly been faced with this doctrine in immigration matters. As Mackie
points out, this is probably because deportation powers are generally not seen
as requiring natural justice in the ordinary case. 2 The finding of a legitimate
expectation in the situation of where an immigrant is confronted with a
sudden deportation order, or when a Minister's permit is prematurely
revoked, may give rise to the entitlement of a hearing. Has natural justice
found its way into immigration law?
Legitimate expectation has only recently been clarified by the courts. It has
developed extensively in Australia, the United Kingdom, and is currently
finding application in Canada as well. The Canadian courts, a little wary of
the concept, are presently trying to define it. They struggle with the following
questions: Is legitimate expectation synonymous with a right; is it a substantive or procedural concept; what kind of remedy or protection does it offer;
is this doctrine a form of administrative estoppel which binds public authorities; does this principle attempt to fetter the discretion of immigration
authorities? In this paper, I will examine these issues through an analysis of
the case law which has developed in this area. After discussing significant
English and Australian decisions, I will explore how the Canadian courts have
dealt with the topic.
ENGLISH, AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND
JURISPRUDENCE
Remedies in law have always been connected with rights being at stake. The
duty to act judicially, as put by De Smith, arises only when a decision is
rendered which affects an individual's rights. 3 But Lord Denning challenged
this customary belief, in Schmidt v. Secretaryfor Home Affairs4, when he
introduced the concept of legitimate expectation into English law. It would
appear that with the following sentence, Lord Denning sought to extend the
parameters of natural justice when he described the elements to impose an
obligation of fairness:
"It all depends on whether he has some right or interest, or I would add,
some legitimate expectation, of which it would not be fair to deprive him
5
without hearing what he has to say."
2.

Ken Mackie, "Expectations and Natural Justice" (1985) 59 AustralianLaw Journal
40.

3.

S.A. Re Smith, JudicialReview ofAdministrative Action, fourth ed. by J.M. Evans
(London: Stevens, 1980).

4.

[1969] 2 Ch. 149.
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It was recognized, in this case, that the possession of a 'legitimate
expectation' could give rise to the entitlement to a hearing in order to ensure
fairness and justice. Schmidt, an alien student, was given permission to enter
the United Kingdom for a limited period of time. When the period was over,
Schmidt made an application to the Home Secretary for an extension, but was
refused and was not given a hearing. In the following passage, Lord Denning
explained the type of situation in which legitimate expectation could arise.
He stated that an immigrant:
"... has no right to enter this country except by leave; and, if he is given
leave to come for a limited period, he has no right to stay for a day longer
than the permitted time. If his permit is revoked before the time limit
expires, he ought, I think to be given an opportunity of making representations: for he would have a legitimate expectation of being allowed to stay for
the permitted time. Except in such a case, a foreign alien has no right and, I
would add, no legitimate expectation-of being allowed to stay. He can be
refused without reasons
given and without a hearing. Once his time has
6
expired, he has to go."

In one sense, as Wade points out, it was for the purpose of restricting the right
to be heard that legitimate expectation was first introduced into the law. 7
Nonetheless, Lord Denning's statement illustrates than an immigrant may
legitimately expect to be able to stay for the duration of his or her permit.
A highly noted Australian decision which adopted a narrow approach to the
legitimate expectation doctrine was Salemi v. Minister of Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs (No. 2).8 This was the first decision by the Australian High
Court to consider the application of the legitimate expectation doctrine in the
context of an immigration matter. Salemi was a prohibited immigrant. The
government had publicly declared a general amnesty for illegal immigrants.
The plaintiff applied to the Department of Immigration for the grant of
resident status but was refused on the basis that there were exceptions to the
amnesty. Faced with a deportation order, Salemi argued that any decision
concerning deportation had to be made in accordance with the principles of
natural justice. The High Court held that the Minister was not bound to
comply with the rules of natural justice prior to exercising his power of

5.

Ibid, at 170.

6.

Ibid, at 171.

7.

E.W.R. Wade,Administrative Law,(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) at 522.

8.

[1977] 137 C.L.R. 396.
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deportation. Barwick C.J. equated legitimate expectation to the concept of a
legal right:
"It is a lawful expectation which is in mind. I cannot attribute any other
meaning in the language of lawyer to the word "legitimate" than meaning
which expresses the concept of entitlement of recognition by law. Understood, the expression probably adds little, if anything to the concept of a
right." 9
Although there may exist some ambiguities in the concept of legitimate
expectation, one element is clear: the expectation need not be an enforceable
right.
Barwick C.J.'s statement was expressly criticized by the Privy Council in
Attorney GeneralofHongKong v. Ng Yuen Shiu1 0 , a noteworthy immigration
decision. Lord Fraser stated:
"With great respect to the learned Chief Justice, their Lordships considered
the word "legitimate" in that expression falls to be read as meaning "reasonable". Accordingly "legitimate expectations" in this context are capable of
including expectations which go beyond enforceable legal rights, provided
they have some reasonable basis." 11
In this case, Ng was one of a thousand illegal immigrants. The government
made a public announcement that each illegal immigrant would be interviewed and dealt with on his or her merits. Ng was ordered to be deported
without having the right to be heard. The Privy Council held that in so acting,
Ng's reasonable expectations were denied, namely expectations which were
based upon the government's own statements. This was viewed as unfair by
Lord Fraser, who justified the application of the doctrine, while also limiting
its scope, in the following often quoted passage:
"When a public authority has promised to follow a certain procedure, it is in
the interest of good administration that it should act fairly and should implement its promise,
so long as implementation does not interfere with its statutory duty." 12
The Ng Yuen Shiu case illustrates the possibility of natural justice being
applied within an immigration setting. Nonetheless, the courts have been

9.

Ibid, at 404.

10.

[1983]2ALLER 346 (P.C.).

11.

Ibid, at 350.

12.

Ibid, at 351.
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reluctant to accord natural justice in certain areas, notably in cases involving
revocation of temporary entry permits. In the New Zealand case of Tobias v.
May 13 , an immigrant was granted a permit to remain in New Zealand for one
month. Prior to the expiry of the permit, an application was made and granted
for an extension. Before the expiry of the extension, an agent of the Minister
of Immigration revoked the applicant's permit, with no reasons provided.
Quiliam J. held that the Minister of Immigration did not owe the alien a right
to be heard. After consideration of the statement of Lord Denning in the
Schmidt case, he dismissed it as obiter and distinguished that case on the facts.
As pointed out by Hodgson:
"The decision in Tobias seems to have turned on the treatment of aliens in a
special category and on a rather wide statutory power of revocation, evidencing in the opinion of Quilliam J., a legislative intention
to confer upon the
14
Minister freedom of action with regard to aliens."
Quilliam J. inferred, that if the Minister was bound by the audi alteram
partem rule in such a circumstance, his discretion would be severely limited.
The courts have also been hesitant to find a legitimate expectation in situations involving the renewal or expiration of temporary entry permits. In the
case of R. v. Ministerof ImmigrationandEthnicAffairs:exparteRatu15 , two
applicants were given temporary entry permits to enter Australia. They
obtained employment, contrary to their signed undertakings, so once their
permit expired they became prohibited immigrants. Deportation orders were
issued against them, but no reasons were provided. The court decided that
the Minister's actions were lawful and that he or she had no obligation to give
advance notice of the reasons for making the orders. The order was not
depriving the prohibited immigrant of a right or legitimate expectation to
remain, as such right or legitimate expectation did not exist in the first place.
As in the Tobias case, the court concluded that the discretion conferred on
the Minister by the Act in question, was not qualified by an obligation to
observe the rules of natural justice. Further, the court held that it had no
jurisdiction to review the exercise of discretion.
The case of Haj-Ismail (H.andM.) v. Ministerfor Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs16 involved a renewal of temporary entry permits. The male applicant
13. [1976] 1 N.S.L.R. 509.
14., D.C. Nodgson, "The Current Status of the Legitimate Expectation in Administrative
Law." (1984) 14 Melbourne UniversityLaw Review 706.
15.

[1977] 137 C.L.R. 461.
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and his wife entered Australia pursuant to temporary entry permits and
continued to reside there on the authority of further permits. The male
applicant was approved subsequently as a private overseas student and then
he and his wife made an application for resident status pursuant to a letter
written by the Minister recommending that Haj-Ismail lodge a formal application. The letter also stated "provided they are able to meet normal immigration health and character requirements, they will then be granted change of
status to residents." 17 The applicants contended that by virtue of this letter,
they had a legitimate expectation that they would be granted resident status,
which entitled them to an opportunity to be heard in the event that the Minister
did not honour the expectation. In the alternative, the male applicant argued
that he possessed a legitimate expectation of being allowed to remain in
Australia until the completion of his studies. At the trial level, the first
contention was dismissed by the judge, as the letter only referred to what
would happen if the applicants were able to meet all the requirements:
"Nothing in the letter, created in favour of the applicants in this case, any
entitlement to resident status or any expectation that resident status would, as
a certainty be granted. It therefore in my view, remained open to an officer
considering the applications to refuse them without hearing the applicants

and without 18
giving them reasons. Nothing they had been given was being
taken away."
With respect to the second contention, the judge ruled that there was a right
to be heard arising from the male applicant's legitimate expectation of being
able to complete his studies in Australia. On appeal, the full Federal Court
agreed with the trial judge's first ruling. Davies J.agreed in principle with
the second holding, but dismissed it on the facts, as the male applicant could
not have acquired a legitimate expectation concerning completion of his
studies, since he had failed to produce any positive results after five years of
research. Once again, it was made clear that there was no obligation on the
Minister to observe the rules of natural justice before refusing resident status
or ordering deportations. As noted by Mackie, it will require exceptional
circumstances to create an expectation in situations where there is an otherwise unfettered discretion to act vested in the administrative authofity. He
states:

16.

[1981] 36 A.L.R. 516.

17.
18.

Ibid, at 520.
Ibid, at 533.
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"The circumstances must be such that it can be predicted with some certainty
that an undertaking is given to act in that particular manner and that this has
been relied upon by the person affected by the subsequent exercise of the
power." 19

CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE
The doctrine of legitimate expectation has not been confined to English and
Australian jurisdictions. It has been invoked in the Canadian courts as well,
where there has been more hesitancy to embrace the doctrine. While some
judges have considered it, others will avoid addressing legitimate expectation, if at all possible. Yet the reasons for this seem to lie in a Canadian
unfamiliarity with the subject rather than a downright rejection of the con0
cept. In the case of Ministerof Manpowerand Immigrationv. Hardaya12
the

applicant had a Minister's permit authorizing him to remain in Canada and
to engage in employment. It was cancelled and he was not given a hearing or
a reason for cancellation. The applicant sought judicial review under section
28(1) of the FederalCourtAct.2 ' He invoked the Schmidt case to support the
proposition that if a permit is revoked before the time limit expires, a holder
should be allowed to make submissions, as it was his or her legitimate
expectation of being allowed to stay for the permitted time. The Federal Court
of Appeal accepted this argument and concluded that the applicant ought to
be given the opportunity to make submissions so as not to be denied the
benefit of the principles of natural justice. The Minister of Immigration
appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. The court expressed the view that
section 37(1) of the Immigration Act2 2 gave the Minister a discretionary
power that is very broad to grant, extend or cancel a permit, but did not
otherwise address the legitimate expectation argument. The court decided the
case on jurisdictional grounds. It was pointed out that the remedy of section
28 of the FederalCourtAct has a limitation to the jurisdiction of the court
when dealing with "... a decision or order of an administrative nature not
required by law to be made on a judicial or quasi-judicial basis ...
"23 The

technical nature of the provisions provided the answer. It was concluded that

19.

Supra,note 2 at 42.

20.

[1978] 1 S.C.R. 470.

21.

FederalCourtAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, s. 28(1).

22.

ImmigrationAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, s. 37(1).

23.

Supra, note 21.
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since a Minister's decision to cancel a permit was of an administrative nature,
it fell within the limitation and was not subject to such review.
The case of Minister of Employment and Immigration v. Moktar Bendahmane2 4, illustrates another instance where the Federal Court of Appeal was
willing to consider the legitimate expectation doctrine. In this case, an
Algerian citizen came to Canada with a visa that he obtained by inaccurate
representation. An exclusion order was issued against him. He appealed, and
before a decision was rendered, he received an official letter stating that he
might be eligible for administrative review as the status of a refugee. Unfortunately the letter did not indicate the correct procedure to follow. Bendahmane filed a refugee claim, but learned that the Minister was going to refuse
the claim without further consideration. The court decided that since the
Minister had previously considered claims that were not in accordance with
the statutory procedure, the doctrine of fairness required the Minister to
consider Bendahmane's claim. The principle of legitimate expectation was
applied as in the Ng Yuen Shiu case. Hugessen J.A. stated that as the Minister
had promised to give considerations to Bendahmane's claim for refugee
status, and since this procedure did not conflict with his statutory duty, then
he should act fairly by implementing the promise.
There are a number of Canadian immigration cases involving backlog procedures for refugees. In some situations it is advantageous for an immigrant's
status to be determined according to the specific backlog criteria. In other
cases, such as in Yhap v. Minister of Employment and Immigration25 , such
criteria might prove to be disadvantageous. In this case, the applicant
intended to claim refugee status in Canada. He and twenty-four others were
part of a refugee Backlog Clearance Programme, and were to be interviewed
by immigration officers to determine whether there were sufficient humanitarian or compassionate grounds, pursuant to section 114(2) of the Immigration Act, to exempt them from the requirements of section 9 of the Act. The
sections read as follows:
"9(1) Except in such cases as are prescribed, every immigrant and visitor
shall make an application for and obtain a visa before that person appears at
a port of entry.
114(2) The Governor in Council may by regulation exempt any person from
any regulation made under subsection (1) or otherwise facilitate the admis-

24.
25.

[1989] 3 F.C. 16 (C.A.).
[1990] 1 F.C. 722.

(1992) 8 JournalofLaw andSocial Policy

sion of any person where the Governor in Council is satisfied that the person

should be exempted form that regulation or the person's admission should be
facilitated for reasons of publicpolicy or due to the existence of compassionate or humanitarian grounds." 26
Instead of being questioned on humanitarian or compassionate issues, the

immigration officer applied policy directives and guidelines pertaining to the
humanitarian and compassionate review portion of the Backlog Clearance
Programme. The document only applied to a small part of the backlog
population. The guidelines were rigid and inflexible, as opposed to the wide
discretion accorded to the Governor in Council by section 114(2). The
applicant submitted that the Minister had failed to fulfil his legitimate
expectation of a section 114(2) review, which was promised to persons in the
Refugee Backlog. The legitimate expectation was based on his contention
that the Minister had made public statements indicating that persons claiming
refugee status before a certain date would have humanitarian or compassionate considerations taken into account. The court avoided the legitimate

expectation argument and concluded that regardless of what promises were
made by the Minister, the applicant was entitled to a review under section
114(2) of the Immigration Act, in order to determine whether there were
humanitarian or compassionate considerations which might warrant an
exemption from section 9(1) of the Act. The court stated that the discretion
contained in section 114(2) was not to be limited by inflexible policies. These
policy guidelines did in fact constitute a fetter on the power of the Governor
in Council to exempt a person from section 9 requirements.
In the case of Naredo v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 27, the applicants were denied refugee status. After several unsuccessful
proceedings, members of parliament made a plea to the Minister of Immigration to exercise his humanitarian and compassionate discretion, pursuant to
section 114(2) of the ImmigrationAct. The applicants were successful and
were permitted to be landed from within Canada. They were granted
Minister's permits, which were extended periodically. After two years, they
were advised that their permits would not be extended, on the motion of the
Minister's successor, and they were requested to depart Canada. The applicants raised an estoppel argument. They asserted that the current immigration
officer was estopped by the temporary relaxation of refusal effected by her
predecessor, in his words "as exceptions to current legislative practice '28 .
26.

Supra,note 22, ss. 9(1), 114(2).

27.

(1990), 11 Imm. L.R. (2d) 12 (F.C.T.D.).
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The court's response was that the previous Minister had no legal authority to
promise the applicants that they would be landed from within Canada. It is
section 114(2) which accords a discretion to exempt individuals from regulations. As Muldoon J. stated:
"The body upon whom or which Parliament has conferred not a duty, but a
power, of deciding or determining any question of exemption or facilitation
by regulation is the Governor in Council. If one went so far as to consider
the exercise of that power to be a duty, which it is not according to subsec-

tion 114(2), then it appears to have been discharged by not passing any such
regulation, since the responsible Minister did not
2 9 recommend it and, apparently neither did any of her cabinet colleagues".
As for the contention that the applicants relied on the Minister's short-lived
intention to their detriment, the court asserted that there was no evidence of
any irreversible harm suffered by the applicants by what ought to have been
their short-lived reliance. Any proceeding which had been withdrawn could
have been re-opened.
The applicants claimed that they had a legitimate expectation of having their
application for permanent residence allowed. They relied on the Bendahmane
case, to support their position that the Minister should have implemented the
promise as this would not have interfered with the statutory duty. In the words
of the court "it is clear that, since the Court has no authority to dictate the
outcome of the exercise of the Minister's discretion, it is certain that no
previous Minister can do that either."' 30 The court characterized the promise
to exercise discretion in recommending an exemption from the requirements
of section 9(1) of the ImmigrationActas a substantive promise and concluded
that legitimate expectation only binds authorities with respect to procedural
premises. (This issue shall be dealt with in greater detail further on). The only
promise that the Minister was bound by was to accord careful consideration
to the applicant's request for permanent residence. The Hardayal case was
invoked to illustrate that decisions such as issuing, extending or cancelling a
permit, pursuant to section 37 of the ImmigrationAct are not subject to the
right to a hearing. The court was careful to point out that the benefit of section
114(2) of the Act is not a right which can be invoked by the applicants. No
measure lies to force the Minister or the Governor in Council to come to a
specific conclusion.
28. Ibid. at 18.
29.
30.

Ibid. at 20-21.
Ibid. at 22.
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Three Canadian cases where it was advantageous for immigrants to be dealt
with according to the new backlog procedure were: Husequin Zeybekoglu et.
aL v. Ministerof Employment31 , Bikker Singh Gill v. MinisterofEmployment
and Immigration32, and Dermitas v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration)33 . In these cases, expectations arose from promises by the
Minister that measures would be taken to deal with the existing backlog of
refugees. The applicants applied for refugee status but all of their claims were
rejected. In each case, the applicants went through various proceedings,
including unsuccessful applications for redetermination before the Immigration Appeal Board. The applicants contended that they had the right to
credible basis hearings before an adjudicator and a member of the Refugee
Division in order to determine whether their claims had any valid basis. If
decisions were granted in their favour, their files would be dealt with
according to new backlog guidelines.
The Zeybekoglu case set a precedent for the later cases by establishing that
there was no legitimate expectation on the part of the applicants, as their
status had already been determined by the Immigration Appeal Board which
denied their application for redetermination. Joyal J. stated that the program
specially set up to deal with the backlog did not in any way relate to the
applicants as they were not part of this group. Thus they could no longer
reasonably expect to be dealt with under the backlog system.
In the Gill and Dermitas cases, the applicants wanted their files to be dealt
with pursuant to certain refugee regulations which allowed some individuals
to make applications for landing from within Canada, and provided an
exemption from all but health and security requirements. Teitlebaum J.
presided on both of these cases. With respect to the legitimate expectations
argument, he developed a two-step test. Two questions must be answered:
"1. Whether the Minister's ...declaration or 'promise' and the subsequent
publications and Regulations create a "legitimate or reasonable expectation"
and
2. Whether the applicants must establish that enabling legislation allows the
Minister to fulfil this expectation, (respondent's position) or, whether the
respondent must rather establish a statutory bar preventing the Minister from
complying (applicant's position)."'34

31.
32.

(8 May 1991), T-2894-90 (F.C.T.D.) [unreported].
(30 July 1991), T-2061-90 (F.C.T.D.) [unreported].

33.

(30 July 1991), T-2845-90 (F.C.T.D.) [unreported].
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With respect to the Gill case, the same reasoning and facts were applied as
in Zeybekoglu, and the court found there was no legitimate expectation. In
light of this finding, it was not necessary to deal with the second question. In
the Dermitascase, Teitlebaum J. distinguished Zeybekoglu, as the applicant's
claims had not been dealt with, for the Immigration Appeal Board had not
denied the redetermination applications. He concluded that it was reasonable
for the applicant to expect that his claim would be dealt with under the
backlog system for he was still part of the backlog. As the answer to the first
question in the test was affirmative, then it was necessary to proceed to the
second question. The Bendahmane case was cited to illustrate that the
Minister should have fulfilled his promise to consider the applicant's refugee
claim as long as it did not conflict with her statutory duty. Since the Minister
had not pleaded a statutory bar, then there was nothing preventing the
applicant from having a credible basis hearing.
The case Terge Bakkeskaug v. Minister of Employment and Immigration and
MinisterofStateforExternalAffairs3 5 dealt with the refusal to grant a family
application for immigration to Canada. During the family medical examination, it was discovered that the applicant's son had cancer, but they were
informed by the doctor that this cancer was curable, and the disease should
pose no problem for immigration as all the treatment would be received out
of Canada. Nonetheless, the applicant was rejected pursuant to section 19(1)
(a) (ii) of the Immigration Act3 6 , and Regulation 2 of the Immigration
Regulation.37 In his appeal, the applicant invoked the doctrine of legitimate
expectations, and cited the Ng Yuen Shiu case. He claimed that the doctor, as
an agent of the Minister, had told them that their application would not be
refused until after the completion of their son's medical treatment and that
the Minister was estopped from refusing the application as a result. In light
of the representations, the applicant claimed he had a "legitimate right of
expectation '3 8 to be able to come into the country, or at least be heard with
respect to the medical decision. In its rejection of the legitimate expectation
argument, the court held that the doctor was not acting as an agent of .the
Minister's office, as he was an independent doctor. The estoppel argument

34.

Supra, note 32 at page 9.

35.

(25 September 1991), T-1837-90 (F.C.T.D.) [unreported].

36.

Supra, note 22, s. 19(1)(a)(ii).

37.

ImmigrationRegulation, 1978 SOR/78-172.

38.

Supra, note 35 at 5.
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was rejected because, in addition to the fact that the doctor had no authority
to make representations or promises on behalf of the department, the words
of the doctor could not constitute a 'promise', intended to be relied on, but
39
rather "comments holding out hope".
ANALYSIS
As a starting point, it is useful to consider the statement of Rouleau J. from
the Bakkeskaug case: "the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be
applied outside a procedural context." 4 0 There are two aspects to the substantive or procedural nature of a legitimate expectation. There is the actual
expectation, and then there is the protection that it can provide. In terms of
the expectation itself, it can be procedural in the sense that it relates solely
to being granted, for example, an unbiased hearing before a decision is made,
or substantive, in that the expectation relates to the granting of a benefit or
privilege such as the renewal of a license or permit. As noted by Elias, a
substantive expectation is more extensive since an actual benefit or other
advantage will be conferred or continued. The procedural concept offers a
more limited expectation, mainly, that the decision affecting the individual
will not be taken until he or she has had the chance to make representations.
In that situation, the expectation is not that the benefit itself will be conferred.

41

The next aspect to consider is the protection, or judicial remedy offered by
the legitimate expectation. Axe the remedies procedural, substantive or both?
The protection is procedural in the sense, as Forsyth illustrates, that the
decision maker is not bound to exercise the discretion in a particular way, he
or she is only bound to grant a hearing to the person affected. But he argues
that:
"In addition to procedural protection legitimate expectations are, or ought to
be, substantively protected, i.e. that in order to protect a legitimate expectation a public body would be bound, save42in exceptional circumstances, to
exercise its discretion in a particular way."

39.

Ibid.

40.

Ibid. at 6.

41.
42.

P. Elias, "Legitimate Expectation and Judicial Review," New Directionsin Judicial
I Review, CurrentLegalProblems. 1988, at 39.
C.F. Forsyth, "The Provenance and Protection of Legitimate Expectations", (1988)
47 CambridgeLaw Journal240.
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He admits, nonetheless, that most decisions do not accord substantive protection. By requiring a decision-make to act only in accordance with an
43
assurance or undertaking, its discretion may become fettered.
It would be fair to conclude that whether the individual expects a substantive
benefit or a procedural one, the judicial remedy, if any, is procedural. Thus, if
someone has a substantive legitimate expectation, such as the renewal of a
license or permit, the most that he or she is entitled to is a hearing before a renewal
is refused. 4 4 While there might have been a substantive aspect in the Ng Yuen
Shiu case, in that the court did order the government to implement its promise,
45
Mackie carefully points out that the promise was in fact to give a hearing.
It appears that the applicant in the Bakkeskaug case phrased his argument
incorrectly. He claimed to have a "legitimate right of expectation" to come
into the country. As noted by Rouleau I., the position of the Supreme Court
of Canada is clearly illustrated in their recent decision, Reference re Canada
Assistance Plan (B.C.):
"there is no support in Canadian or English cases for the position that the
doctrine of legitimate expectation can create substantive rights. It is part of
the rules of procedural fairness which can govern administrative bodies.
Where it is applicable, it can create a right to make a representation or be
consulted. It does not fetter the decision following the representations or
46
consultation.'

Thus, legitimate expectation does not offer a substantive right. The only right
that the holder of a legitimate expectation is entitled to is the "ubstantial right
to be accorded natural justice." 47
It is clear that some litigators invoke estoppel as part of their legitimate
expectation argument. Parallels have been made between the two doctrines.
In the Bendahmane case, Marceau J.A. stated in his dissent:
"One can conceive of a sort of application of common law estoppel in
administrative matters, given the representation on the one hand and the
reaction
of trust and reliance on the other, as a means of ensuring fairness."48
43.
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At first this analogy might seem inaccurate as legitimate expectation appears
to found an action, as opposed to estoppel which functions as a defence. Yet
it must be noted that legitimate expectation is invoked generally to respond,
for example, to the exercise of the right of deportation of an immigration
official. In a sense, legitimate expectation is similar to estoppel, in that an
individual who has had his or her expectation disappointed, will invoke it to
prevent the authority from going back on its word to his or her detriment.
Whether these doctrines are synonymous remains unclear. Nevertheless,
immigration law is a difficult area to prove estoppel because of the extensive
discretionary powers which are often involved.
The issue of discretion becomes significant when the estoppel and legitimate
expectation arguments are invoked. If these doctrines are found to exist, a
power which involves discretion may become fettered. The case of Dee v.
Canada (Ministry of Employment and Immigration)4 9 addressed this issue.
The appellant, after being granted refugee status, applied for a Minster's
permit, pursuant to section 37 of the ImmigrationAct. He was unsuccessful,
and no reasons were given for the refusal. The appellant claimed that it was
the Minister's policy, as stated in a manual prepared for the guidance of the
immigration officers, to give a Minister's permit to all those who had been
determined to be Convention refugees. The appellant asserted that he had a
legitimate expectation that the policy would be applied in his case. He
furtherly submitted, that once the Minister had chosen not to follow the
policy, fairness required that he be given a chance to be heard. The court
dismissed the legitimate expectation argument. Pratte J. said, "the policy,
whatever its effect, did not change the law which gave the Minister the
discretionary power to issue permits." 50 He cited the Maple Lodge Farms
case 5 l to illustrate that the discretion given by a statute cannot be confined
by general policy guidelines. To enforce such guidelines, such as in the
present case, would fetter the Minister in the exercise of his discretion. Pratte
J. agreed with the trial judge that the appellant had not been treated unfairly
because he could have made representations concerning the Minister's objections to the issuance of the permit. The appeal was dismissed. Thus, what
appear as "pre-determined policies", which may create expectations, will not
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have the effect of requiring officials to exercise their discretion in such a way
as to achieve a specific result. Young states that the "expectation goes to the
manner of the exercise of the power, but not its result. '52 The legitimate
expectation doctrine does not have as its purpose to fetter discretionary
powers or to control the form or substance of policy, rather "the focus is not
on the policy but on the conduct of officials and the manner in which they
make policy."15 3
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of legitimate expectation suggests the possibilities of natural
justice applying within the context of immigration law. The Canadian courts,
although slightly unfamiliar at first with the doctrine, have begun to accord
legitimate expectation the careful consideration it deserves. Through an
analysis of the case law, it is clear that in Canada, the expectation need not
be an enforceable right and it does not serve to create substantive rights. What
the expectation can create, if reasonable, is the right to natural justice. While
the expectation itself may be substantive or procedural, the protection it offers
is clearly procedural. Generally, it will entitle the individual to a hearing.
Legitimate expectation may be similar to administrative estoppel, but it
remains doubtful whether these doctrines are actually synonymous. Finally,
it has been made clear by the Canadian courts that the legitimate expectation
cannot function to fetter the discretion of administrative bodies.
Legitimate expectation is highly significant in the area of immigration law,
as the concept was created with an immigration matter in mind. It is
immigrants, often treated unfairly, who need to benefit from the protection
that the doctrine can offer. These individuals should be able to rely on the
words or conduct of immigration authorities. If these authorities do their job
correctly, the issue of legitimate expectation should not come up. Yet, if
officials do not keep their words, then in certain instances, the rules of natural
justice should apply to guarantee fairness to a system which is not always
fair.
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